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Randomness is an important resource for many applications, from gambling to secure commu-
nication. However, guaranteeing that the output from a candidate random source could not have
been predicted by an outside party is a challenging task, and many supposedly random sources used
today provide no such guarantee. Quantum solutions to this problem exist, for example a device
which internally sends a photon through a beam-splitter and observes on which side it emerges,
but, presently, such solutions require the user to trust the internal workings of the device. Here we
seek to go beyond this limitation by asking whether randomness can be generated using untrusted
devices—even ones created by an adversarial agent—while providing a guarantee that no outside
party (including the agent) can predict it. Since this is easily seen to be impossible unless the user
has an initially private random string, the task we investigate here is private randomness expansion.
We introduce a protocol for private randomness expansion with untrusted devices which is de-
signed to take as input an initially private random string and produce as output a longer private
random string. We point out that private randomness expansion protocols are generally vulnerable
to attacks that can render the initial string partially insecure, even though that string is used only
inside a secure laboratory; our protocol is designed to remove this previously unconsidered vulner-
ability by privacy amplification. We also discuss extensions of our protocol designed to generate an
arbitrarily long random string from a finite initially private random string. The security of these
protocols against the most general attacks is left as an open question.
I. INTRODUCTION
Random numbers are important in a wide range of ap-
plications. In some, for example statistical sampling or
computer simulations, pseudo-randomness may be suffi-
cient. However, in others, such as gambling or cryptog-
raphy, the use of pseudo-randomness may be detrimen-
tal—a shrewd adversary might identify and exploit any
deviation from true randomness. Since quantum mea-
surements are the only physical processes we know of
that appear to be intrinsically random, it is natural to
try to design quantum random number generators. In
fact, devices which generate randomness through quan-
tum measurement are commercially available1. However,
to be convinced that the outputs of these devices are ran-
dom and private, i.e. unknown to any third party, the
user must either trust or verify that they are built to a
specified design.
It would be desirable if users could instead guaran-
tee the privacy of their newly generated random strings
solely by tests on the outputs of their devices. This would
eliminate the need for a complicated and time-consuming
verification that the devices are functioning according to
design and contain no accidental or deliberate security
flaws. A protocol requiring only tests on device outputs
is said to be device-independent.
The notion of device-independent cryptography was
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1 For example, www.idquantique.com.
first introduced by Mayers and Yao [1], although with
hindsight it could be argued that the seed of the idea
was already implicit in the Ekert key distribution pro-
tocol [2]. Proving device-independent security of cryp-
tographic tasks is a challenging task. The first quantum
key distribution protocol with proven device-independent
security was devised by Barrett et al. (BHK) [3]2. Al-
though the BHK protocol provided a crucial proof of
principle, it achieves provable general security at the
price of low efficiency. The idea was subsequently devel-
oped, producing more efficient protocols provably secure
against restricted classes of attack [5–9] and then against
general attacks [10–14]3.
Here we consider a different task, private random-
ness expansion. The aim is to use an initially private
random string to generate a longer one, in a way that
guarantees that the longer string is also kept private
from all other parties. In this paper, we investigate the
task of private randomness expansion within the device-
independent paradigm.
This task was first introduced in [15] (the work pre-
sented here is essentially a condensed version of Chap-
ter 5 of [15]) and has been subsequently developed [16].
2 See also Ref. [4] for some further details and discussion.
3 These latter protocols have an important difference from those in
the former set: they require that at least one of the users ensures
additional no-signalling conditions that require multiple isolated
regions within their laboratories. Specifically, they are valid only
if (for at least one of the users) each input is made to a separate
device unable to communicate with the others.
2In the latter work, Pironio et al. analyse a protocol re-
lated to the one in [15] (they use the CHSH inequality
instead of GHZ tests) and present a security analysis for
a restricted class of attacks (ones in which an adversary is
forced to measure any quantum systems they hold prior
to performing privacy amplification). Furthermore, they
report an experimental demonstration of their protocol.
Quantum private randomness expansion is an impor-
tant cryptographic task in its own right, but also has
some features in common with quantum key distribution,
so device-independent protocols and security proofs for
this task should also shed light on analogous results for
quantum key distribution. Conversely, any secure pro-
tocol for device-independent key distribution that gener-
ates a secret key longer than the amount of randomness
used in the protocol could also be used for randomness
expansion by performing both sides of the key-generation
protocol in a single laboratory. Candidate protocols of
this type have recently been proposed (see above); at
present they require a large number of isolated devices
(cf. Footnote 3). Obviously, it would be preferable not
to require this practically challenging constraint, all else
being equal.4
There is one significant new insight in the present work
that has not appeared previously: the protocols given
in [15] and [16] are not secure in a composable way. On
the contrary, there are quite plausible scenarios in which
the final private random string output by these proto-
cols can become partly compromised, in which case the
protocol is evidently insecure. The protocol we present
here has hence been slightly modified from the one given
in [15] (see Section IV for further explanation).5
Our protocol is intended to allow an honest user, Bob,
to input a sufficiently long initial private random string
to devices constructed by a potential adversary, Eve, and
obtain as output a finite longer private random string.
We also propose using this protocol within an extended
one to allow an initial private random string to generate
an arbitrarily long private random output string. Our
extended protocol has the undesirable feature of requir-
ing a large number of devices (dependent on the amount
of expansion required) which must be prevented from
communicating with one another. In both protocols, the
length of initial string required depends on the tolerance
for risking successful cheating by Eve. Neither protocol
is optimized for efficiency.
Proving security of our protocols against the most gen-
eral possible attacks remains an open question. The
aim of this work is rather to introduce the task, to pro-
pose some candidate protocols for its solution, and to
explain some intuitions that suggest they are good can-
4 Analyzing these recent protocols and their implications for ran-
domness expansion goes beyond the work reported here; however,
readers should be aware of their existence.
5 The protocol in [16] can also be modified to deal with this security
loophole, as we discuss in Footnote 27 below.
didates to examine further. In so doing we should stress
that, while the history of quantum cryptography shows
that initially unproven intuitions can spark major ad-
vances—indeed the subject was originally founded on
such intuitions [17, 18]—it also shows that they should
be approached critically and finally accepted only if and
when proven.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. Assumptions
We make the following assumptions:
1. Bob’s laboratory is secure. In particular, secret
messages cannot be sent from Eve’s devices, once
within his laboratory, to the outside world6, and
Eve cannot probe his laboratory from outside.
2. Bob can isolate any devices in his laboratory, pre-
venting them from sending any signal outside an
isolated region.7
3. Bob has secure classical information processing de-
vices8, with secure authenticated classical commu-
nication between them within his laboratory.9 In
particular, Eve’s devices are unable to spoof classi-
cal communications within Bob’s laboratory; they
can output to Bob’s classical devices only via pre-
scribed channels.
4. Eve is constrained by the laws of quantum theory.
5. All communication channels and devices operate
noiselessly10.
Note that we do not include the common assumption
that Bob has complete knowledge of the operation of
the devices he uses to implement the protocol. Instead,
we suppose that all quantum devices were sourced from
6 Without this, the task is impossible, since the devices could sim-
ply broadcast their inputs and outputs.
7 For example, by placing them each in their own sub laboratory.
Alternatively, when it is sufficient to prevent communication be-
tween the devices during a protocol of finite duration, if we as-
sume the impossibility of faster-than-light signalling, Bob can
isolate the devices by placing them at appropriately space-like
separated locations during the protocol. (Bob could ensure such
separation using trusted classical clocks and rulers.)
8 If Bob cannot trust any classical information processing de-
vice—including his own brain—then he is beyond the help of
cryptographers.
9 Since Eve’s devices can be isolated (cf. Assumption 2), we assume
that any authentication procedures used do not need to consume
secret randomness; of course, if they do, this randomness should
be included in the accounting.
10 This assumption is in practice unrealistic and one would hope to
eventually drop it. Its main purpose is to keep the protocols and
security proofs as simple as possible in the first instance.
3an untrusted party, Eve, who may construct them using
complete knowledge of Bob’s protocol. From Bob’s per-
spective, these devices are simply black boxes with inputs
and outputs.
We briefly consider weakening the assumption that Eve
is constrained by quantum theory at the end of the paper.
B. Non-classical correlations
Bob will want to perform tests on the devices supplied
by Eve. We assume Bob’s testing protocol is known pub-
licly, and in particular is known to Eve, but that it may
involve random inputs which are not known to Eve. In-
deed, a little thought shows that this is essential for any
unconditionally secure protocol. Without private ran-
dom inputs, Eve knows Bob’s entire protocol. To be
useful, the protocol must have at least one valid set of
outputs. Eve can then calculate such a set in advance
and supply her devices with classical records of these pre-
calculated outputs, thus ensuring both that the devices
pass Bob’s tests and that she knows in advance all the
data they generate for Bob. Clearly, Bob cannot generate
any private random data in this scenario.
We thus assume that Bob begins with a private ran-
dom string, and is interested in generating a longer one,
i.e. in private randomness expansion. He needs to ensure
that Eve cannot pre-calculate classical data that she can
supply to her devices in order to pass his tests—otherwise
she can predict all the output data that will be generated
for any given random input, and so he cannot generate
any new private randomness. Bob must thus ensure that
his tests cannot be passed (except perhaps with a small
probability) by devices whose outputs can be described
by a local hidden variable model. To do so, Bob needs
to perform some form of Bell test, in which the devices
are prevented from signalling to one another, either by
physical barriers or by being space-like separated, to en-
sure the presence of non-classical correlations. Secure
private randomness expansion is thus impossible without
Bell tests.
Our intuition is that, conversely, in suitable protocols,
Bell tests make private randomness expansion possible.
Roughly speaking, the underlying idea is that states that
produce non-classical correlations possess some intrinsic
randomness, uncorrelated with any other system in the
universe. So, by verifying the presence of such correla-
tions, Bob can be sure that Eve’s devices are using such
states and hence that he derives genuine private random-
ness from them. The hypothesis is then that, in order to
pass Bob’s verification with a significant probability of
success, Eve’s strategy must be so close to the honest
one that she cannot gain significant information about
Bob’s newly generated private randomness.
The protocols used in this work are based on the fol-
lowing test, which we call aGHZ test [19]11. Bob asks for
three devices, each of which has two settings (which we
label Pi and Qi for the ith device) and can output either
1 or −1. We use pi and qi to denote the values of the out-
puts when inputs Pi and Qi are made. Bob chooses one
of the four triples of settings given by P1P2P3, P1Q2Q3,
Q1P2Q3 and Q1Q2P3, obtaining a result given by the
product of outputs corresponding to the specified inputs:
for example, if his inputs are P1P2P3 he obtains outcomes
p1, p2 and p3. He demands that the product p1p2p3 is
−1, while p1q2q3, q1p2q3 and q1q2p3 are +1. That these
cannot be satisfied by a classical assignment [19] can be
seen by considering the product of the four quantities.
According to Bob’s demands, this must be −1, while the
algebraic expression obtained by a classical assignment
is p21p
2
2p
2
3q
2
1q
2
2q
2
3 , which must be +1. If, instead, the {pi}
and {qi} are obtained from the outcomes of measure-
ments acting on an entangled quantum state, then Bob’s
demands can always be met. In the Appendix, the com-
plete set of operators and states which do this is derived.
In essence, all such operators behave like Pauli σx and
σy operators and the state behaves like a GHZ state,
1√
2
(|000〉 − |111〉), up to local unitaries.
III. PRIVATE RANDOMNESS EXPANSION
A. Security Definitions
In this section, we define what it means for a string
to be private and random. We say that S is a private
random string with respect to a system E if the joint
state of the string and E takes the form
ρISE :=
1
|S|
∑
s
|s〉〈s| ⊗ σE , (1)
for some state σE , where the sum runs over all possible
instances, s, of the string S and the superscript I stands
for “ideal”12. The key properties of this state are that
the E system is uncorrelated to S, and that the possible
instances of s are uniformly distributed.
In practice, it will not be possible to guarantee a state
of this form. Instead, we may have a state
ρRSE :=
∑
s
PS(s)|s〉〈s| ⊗ ρ
s
E , (2)
where the superscript R stands for “real”. We say
that the string S in this state is a δ-private random
11 Other tests of non-locality could also be used, some of which are
discussed in Section V (see also [16]).
12 A note on notation: we tend to use upper case letters to denote
random variables and lower case letters for particular instances
of these random variables. For random variable X, we use |X|
to denote the number of possible outcomes of X. Thus, |S| = 2n
for a bit string S of length n.
4string with respect to E if there exists a σE such that
D(ρISE , ρ
R
SE) ≤ δ, where D(ρ, τ) :=
1
2 tr|ρ − τ | is the
trace distance. The trace distance is related to the opti-
mal probability of guessing which of two states one has.
Its operational significance is that if D(ρ, τ) ≤ δ, then no
physical procedure allows one to distinguish between ρ
and τ with success probability greater than δ. Moreover,
since the trace distance is non-increasing under quan-
tum operations [20], this condition must persist when
the string is used in any application.
In private randomness expansion, typically the raw
outputs of the devices are not δ-private for a sufficiently
small δ, and require privacy amplification in order to re-
duce δ to an acceptable level for security. This is de-
scribed in detail in the next subsection.
It is impossible to devise a finite device-independent
cryptographic protocol that guarantees non-trivial secu-
rity for any task with complete certainty. Eve can always
follow the strategy of guessing the random input string
and supplying appropriate pre-computed outputs: this
has a nonzero probability of success. In particular, it is
impossible to construct a private randomness expansion
protocol that guarantees that the final string is δ-private
(for small δ) against an arbitrary attack by Eve. Our
security criterion thus involves two parameters. We de-
mand that for any strategy chosen by Eve, the a priori
probability that the protocol does not abort and the fi-
nal string is not δ-private is at most ζ, where δ and ζ are
suitably small. We say that a protocol with this property
is a ζ-secure protocol that generates a δ-private string13.
Since δ and ζ are small, Eve has only a small probability
of learning a significant amount of information about the
final string without causing the protocol to abort.
B. Privacy Amplification
Privacy amplification takes an initial string, X ′, about
which a potential adversary has partial knowledge, E,
and compresses it to a shorter string, S, which is ap-
proximately uniformly distributed and independent of
the adversary’s knowledge. This typically requires some
additional randomness, R, to select the function, f , from
some set of functions, F , used for the compression. The
idea is that by choosing the set F appropriately, the final
string, S, is very close to being private and random (ac-
cording to the definition given in the previous section).
Furthermore, we require that the string S is very close
to independent of the randomness, R, used to choose the
function.
Privacy amplification was first studied in the case
where the adversary’s knowledge, E, is classical (see for
example [21–23]) and was later extended to the case
13 A protocol that never aborts is thus ζ-secure if the a priori prob-
ability that the final string is δ-private is at most ζ.
of quantum knowledge [24–26]. In the latter works, it
was shown that the length of extractable private random
string can be characterized in terms of the smooth con-
ditional min-entropy of the initial string, X ′, given the
knowledge, E, the quantum version of which was first
introduced in [26].
The smooth min-entropy can be defined not only for
strings, X ′, but for any quantum state on a system, B.
We first define the non-smooth min-entropy of B given
E for a state ρBE :
Hmin(B|E)ρ := max
σE
sup{λ ∈ R : 2−λ1 ⊗ σE ≥ ρBE},
where the maximization is over normalized density oper-
ators, σE . The ǫ-smooth conditional min-entropy of B
given E is then defined by
Hǫmin(B|E)ρ := max
ρ¯BE
Hmin(B|E)ρ¯, (3)
where the maximization is over a set of positive (and
potentially sub-normalized) operators ǫ-close to ρ with
respect to some distance measure14.
We consider the use of two-universal hash functions for
privacy amplification which are defined as follows [28, 29]:
Definition 1. A set of functions, F from X ′ to S is
two-universal if when fr ∈ F is picked using a uniform
random variable R, for any distinct instances, x′1 and x
′
2,
of X ′, the probability that they give the same values of
S is at most 1|S| , i.e.,
|{r:fr(x′1)=fr(x′2)}|
|R| ≤
1
|S| .
We remark that other appropriate functions could be
used instead—we would like a class of functions with
the fewest members. In particular, privacy amplification
schemes based on Trevisan’s extractor [30] have recently
been shown to be secure even when the information E
is quantum, and in general require a shorter seed than
schemes using two-universal hash functions [31]. To sim-
plify the discussion, given that we do not analyse opti-
mality or security against general attacks, we focus on
two-universal hashing here.
Including the classical spaces used to define the string,
X ′, and the random string used to choose the hash func-
tion, R, the state we have prior to privacy amplification
has the form
ρX′ER =
∑
r,x′
PR(r)PX′ (x
′)|x′〉〈x′| ⊗ ρx
′
E ⊗ |r〉〈r|, (4)
where PR(r) =
1
|R| . After applying the hash function
fr ∈ F , the state takes the form
ρSER =
∑
r,s
PR(r)PS(s)|s〉〈s| ⊗ ρ
s,r
E ⊗ |r〉〈r|, (5)
14 Various distance measures have been used in the past. One popu-
lar approach is to use the purified distance, which is the minimum
trace distance over purifications of the involved states (see [27]
for further details).
5where PS(s)ρ
s,r
E =
∑
x′:fr(x′)=s
PX′(x
′)ρx
′
E . Ideally, the
state of the system in HS would look uniform from Eve’s
point of view, even if she were to learn R (functions for
which this property holds are sometimes called strong ex-
tractors). The variation from this ideal can be expressed
in terms of the trace distance between the state and an
ideal,
D(ρSER, τS ⊗ σER) , (6)
where τS is the maximally mixed state in HS and σER
is an arbitrary state. This distance is bounded in the
following theorem [26].
Theorem 1. If fr is chosen from a two-universal set of
hash functions, F , using a uniform random string, R,
which is uncorrelated with S and E, and is used to map
X ′ to S as described above, then for |S| = 2t and ǫ ≥ 0,
we have
min
σER
D(ρSER, τS ⊗ σER) ≤ ǫ+
1
2
2−
1
2 (H
ǫ
min
(X′|E)−t). (7)
Hence, if Bob chooses t = Hǫmin(X
′|E) − ℓ, for some
ℓ ≥ 0, he can use a random string, R, to compress his
string, X ′, which is partly correlated with a quantum
system held by Eve, to a δ-private string, S, for some
δ ≤ ǫ+ 122
− ℓ
2 .
We remark that privacy amplification is usually dis-
cussed in a three party scenario, in which Alice and Bob
seek to generate a shared random string on which Eve’s
information is negligible. Alice and Bob are required to
communicate during the amplification stage, and thus
leak information (in our case the random string R) about
the amplification process to Eve. Private randomness ex-
pansion, on the other hand, is a task involving only Bob,
who aims to generate data secret from Eve. No infor-
mation need be leaked in amplification since there is no
second honest party needing to perform the same proce-
dure. The random string R hence remains private with
respect to Eve15.
IV. PROTOCOLS
We begin this section by giving a protocol which is de-
signed to allow a private random string to be expanded
by a finite amount. Before performing the protocol, Bob
asks Eve for three devices, each of which has two set-
tings (inputs), (Pi and Qi for the ith device) and can
make two possible outputs, +1 or −1. Bob asks that
whenever these devices are used to measure one of the
four GHZ quantities (P1P2P3, P1Q2Q3, Q1P2Q3 and
15 In principle, Eve can gain a little information about R if and
when she learns S, but only within the tight privacy bounds
implied by (5) and (7).
Q1Q2P3), they return outcomes with the properties spec-
ified in Section I (i.e., whose products are −1, +1, +1
and +1 respectively)16. Furthermore, he asks that these
devices can satisfy these conditions without communicat-
ing. We call these three devices taken together a device
triple. Bob uses his device triple in the following proto-
col.
Protocol 1
This protocol depends on parameters ζ ≥ 0 and δ ≥
0 and can be applied to an initial private string X17.
Although we express it for the case of GHZ tests and
two-universal hashing, it is easily adapted to other Bell
tests or privacy amplification functions.
1. Bob sets up the device triple such that the devices
cannot communicate with one another (cf. Assump-
tion 2), nor send any information outside Bob’s lab-
oratory (cf. Assumption 1).
2. Bob divides his string X into two strings X1 and R
(the relative lengths of these strings depends on the
choice of function used for privacy amplification in
Step 6).
3. Bob uses two bits of X1 to choose one of the four
tests which he performs, ensuring that each device
learns only its input (and not the whole string X1).
He brings all the output bits together.
4. If he receives the wrong product of outputs, he
aborts18, otherwise he turns his output into two
bits using an appropriate assignment (for each test
there are four possible valid output combinations).
In this way, Bob builds a random string X˜ .
5. Bob repeats steps 3 and 4 until he has exhausted
X1.
6. Bob concatenates X1 and X˜ to form a new string
X ′. He computes a suitable value γ := γ(|X1|, ζ, δ),
where |X1| is the number of possible input strings,
δ is the desired privacy parameter for the output
string, and ζ is the a priori risk he will tolerate
16 In practice, Bob might ask for devices that measure either σx or
σz , and for a further device that creates GHZ states. However,
he will not be able to distinguish such devices from another set
satisfying the test but using a different set of states and oper-
ators. We have kept the description in terms of things he can
verify.
17 For any finite length of initial string, there will be minimum
values of ζ and δ below which the protocol never increases the
length of the string.
18 In a more general protocol tolerating noise, Bob need not abort.
Instead, he would collect statistics on when the devices generate
outcomes with the wrong product, and use these to bound the
min-entropy in Step 6.
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FIG. 1: Diagram of the steps in Protocol 1. Together devices
1–3 form a device triple. They are prevented from commu-
nicating with one another (depicted by the walls) or to the
outside world (Eve). Each device learns only the set of inputs
it is supplied with.
that the output string is not δ-private19. He per-
forms privacy amplification on X ′ to form a string
of length log |S| = γ bits which, with a priori
probability greater than (1 − ζ), is δ-private. In
the case of two-universal hashing, R and X ′ have
equal length [25, 26]20 and so Bob should partition
X = (X1, R) such that 2 log2 |X1| = log |R|.
7. The protocol’s output is the concatenated string
(S,R).
The entire setup is shown in Figure 1.
If Eve is constrained by quantum theory, then the only
way she can be certain to pass all of Bob’s tests is if the
joint state shared by the devices is pure and generates un-
biased outcomes (see the Appendix). This strategy gives
no information to Eve. Moreover, in this case, two bits
of X1 generate two new bits of randomness each time
19 In noise-tolerant protocols, γ := γ(|X1|, T, ζ, δ), where T is the
number of tests passed. In either the noiseless or the noise-
tolerant case, finding an explicit form of the function γ that
provably has the desired properties remains an open problem:
see the comments later in this section. Note also that γ may be
zero if any of the parameters are too small.
20 More recently, it has been shown that a shorter R roughly equal
to the size of the output, S, can be used [32]. In the context of
the present protocol, unless there are significant levels of cheating
or noise, we do not expect that this will have a significant effect
on the rate.
the loop is performed. This is an attractive feature of
the GHZ-based protocol: the same operations are used
both to test security and to generate new random bits.
Furthermore, if Bob trusts Eve, he can forego the pri-
vacy amplification step and the shorter protocol is very
efficient, doubling the length of the random key.
That said, of course, the aim is to protect Bob against
a potentially dishonest Eve who can prepare the devices
to include any quantum systems, which may be entangled
with one another and also with an ancillary system kept
under Eve’s control. She may also prepare the devices
with any quantum program to produce outputs from in-
puts21.
It remains an open problem to find a function
γ(|X1|, ζ, δ) (or γ(|X1|, T, ζ, δ) in the noise-tolerant case)
such that the protocol is ζ-secure. Since Eve is con-
strained by quantum theory, the joint quantum state
of the system Bob uses to store X ′ and Eve’s systems
has the form
∑
x′ PX′(x
′)|x′〉〈x′| ⊗ ρx
′
E prior to privacy
amplification. Here, the information, E, should include
any additional information about the protocol that Eve
might possibly infer from data that Bob is not required
by the protocol to keep private (and in realistic applica-
tions may not necessarily be able to keep private): for
example, the length of the final private random string,
whether the protocol aborted, or how many rounds were
performed22.
We would then like a statement which says that, for
any ζ > 0, there exists some calculable ℓ ≥ 0 such that,
for any strategy used by Eve, we have p ≤ ζ, where p
is the probability (averaged over all possible initial ran-
dom strings X) that (i) the protocol does not abort and
(ii) the min-entropy fails to satisfy Hǫmin(X
′|E) ≥ γ − ℓ.
Conversely, if the min-entropy satisfies this bound, it fol-
lows that the string S (of length γ) formed by hashing
X ′ is δ-private for δ = (ǫ + 122
− ℓ
2 ) (see Theorem 1)23.
Intuition suggests—as a working hypothesis awaiting
full analysis—that, in order to ensure a reasonable prob-
ability of the protocol not aborting, Eve cannot deviate
much from her honest strategy, and so the string pro-
duced by a successful run of the protocol almost certainly
satisfiesHǫmin(X
′|E) . 2 log2 |X1| for some suitably small
ǫ. The length of the final output string would then be
log2 |R| + t ≈
4
3 log2 |X | − ℓ, i.e. the protocol would in-
21 In principle, Eve may also design the devices so as to attempt
to send any quantum signals to one another, according to any
algorithm of her choice. However this is pointless if, as in our
protocol, Bob prevents such signalling.
22 One can imagine scenarios in which no such information is in fact
ever leaked to Eve. However, for unconditional and composable
security, Bob’s final string should remain private and random
even if such information becomes known to Eve. See the dis-
cussion at the end of this section for some realistic scenarios in
which this concern applies.
23 Since it is only quantum devices that are supplied by Eve, and
hashing is a classical procedure, there is no security issue associ-
ated with this step.
7crease the length of the string by a factor close to 43 . (For
a long enough initial string, a given level of security can
be achieved with ℓ≪ log2 |X |.)
It is important to note that the string generated by
our protocol, although private with respect to Eve, is
not private with respect to the devices, which could be
programmed to remember their output bits. The gen-
erated random string thus cannot be treated as defining
an effectively independent new input string for the same
devices. Furthermore, it is important that Bob prevents
the devices from sending signals outside his laboratory
until the private randomness is no longer required.
Attacks on the initially private string
In earlier work on randomness expansion [15, 16] it
was argued that there is no need to include X1 in the
string undergoing privacy amplification, the argument
being that since X1 is only used to do operations within
Bob’s laboratory, it always remains secure against the
outside and hence can be included in the final private
string without any processing. However, we argue here
that there are reasonable scenarios in which, on the con-
trary, Eve could learn part of X1 despite the security of
Bob’s laboratory. Protocols in which X1 is left unpro-
cessed in the final string do not have universally compos-
able security, and indeed are evidently insecure in some
reasonable applications.
We illustrate this point by giving a particular strategy
which gives Eve a significant probability of learning some
bits of X1. Suppose Eve programs the devices such that
the protocol aborts unless a set of m specified bits of X1
take specific values24. For small m, Eve can ensure the
devices behave in this way while keeping the probability
of the protocol not aborting significantly above zero. If
the string X1 remained a truly a private random string,
this property should persist if Bob announces whether
the protocol aborted or not (see also Footnote 22). How-
ever, if Eve uses this strategy, the knowledge that the
protocol did not abort would convey to Eve the values of
the m specified bits of X1
25.
To make this point more concrete, imagine that Eve
knows that Bob’s casino relies on purportedly private
random bits that are output from this protocol for
tonight’s operations. If the protocol aborts, Eve knows
24 Eve can do this by fixing pre-specified outputs whose product
is −1 for these bits, so that they are valid outputs for input
P1P2P3 but not for any other input. Alternatively, she can pre-
specify outputs that are invalid: for example, the devices could
be programmed to output 2 (or to fail to make an output) for
any input except P1Q2Q3.
25 Eve also has more general attacks of this type that allow her
to learn some information about some bits: for instance, she
can pre-specify some outputs whose product is 1, which will be
valid for inputs P1Q2Q3, Q1P2Q3 and Q1Q2P3 but will cause
an abort (in the noiseless case) if the input is P1P2P3.
the casino will not open tonight. However, there is a
significant chance that the protocol will not abort, and
the casino will open tonight. Moreover, Eve knows that,
if the casino does open, it will continue to run until the
purportedly private random bit string that Bob has gen-
erated is exhausted. Eve can thus gain information about
some bits conditioned on the casino opening, or staying
open, and profitably bet on the relevant bits. Clearly,
this is not consistent with a sensible definition of private
randomness. Note that the protocol in [16] is equally
vulnerable to attacks of this kind26.
In our protocol, the idea is to avoid this problem by
performing privacy amplification on X1 as well as on X˜.
Another possible strategy is to look for protocols that are
efficient enough in generating new randomness that even
if X1 is discarded prior to privacy amplification, the fi-
nal private random string is longer than the original. The
original random string can then simply be discarded after
use. Protocols based on higher dimensional generaliza-
tions of the GHZ test appear to be good candidates of
this type (see the next section). Other classes of can-
didates are protocols in which the inputs to the devices
correspond to tests only on a relatively small (randomly
chosen) subset of the rounds, with deterministic inputs
used for the remainder, or to protocols in which the in-
puts are chosen with a non-uniform distribution that re-
quires a relatively small amount of randomness to sample
from.27
Iteration via Isolation
The protocol we have presented aims to expand a fi-
nite initial random string by a finite additional amount.
However, it is natural to ask whether indefinite expan-
sion of a finite random string is possible. We now present
an extended protocol which suggests that this may, in
principle, be achievable28. However, this protocol has
the disadvantage that it requires a large number of ad-
ditional devices. In the extended protocol, Bob asks Eve
for N device triples and arranges them such that no two
26 Strictly speaking, as presented, the protocol in [16] never aborts,
although it may fail to increase the length of the initially private
random seed string. However, it is vulnerable to an attack in
which Eve uses the length of the final generated key to infer
information about the purportedly still private random seed. A
fix for this is discussed in the following footnote.
27 This tactic is used in the protocol in [16]. Although, as presented,
the protocol in [16] is vulnerable to the attack discussed here,
this could be fixed by simply discarding the relevant part of the
initial string. Doing so makes the potential insecurity of the
initial string irrelevant, but of course may significantly affect
the accounting in practical implementations. For example, if
applied to the reported experiment in [16], it would mean the
final private random string produced is actually shorter than the
initial private random string.
28 Again, we stress that rigorous analysis remains a task for the
future.
8can communicate, e.g. by placing them in their own sub-
laboratories. He then performs Protocol 1 using the first
device triple, generating a new string (S,R). This is then
used to perform Protocol 1 on the second device triple
and so on29. To get started, this extended protocol re-
quires that the initial private random string is sufficiently
long that it can be securely expanded.
V. TESTS BASED ON OTHER CORRELATIONS
In this section we discuss some alternative ways of con-
straining Eve rather than demanding that her outputs
satisfy GHZ tests, with a view to improving the rate
(i.e., the length of private random string generated by a
given length of initial private random string) while keep-
ing the number of devices required relatively small. One
promising family of correlations come from direct gen-
eralizations of the GHZ correlations to more parties, as
conceived by Pagonis, Redhead and Clifton (PRC) [33].
Their family of tests is such that in the kth version of
this test, 4k−1 devices are required to measure one of 4k
quantities (i.e., log2(4k) bits of randomness are required
per test), while generating 4k − 2 bits of randomness.
(The case k = 1 corresponds exactly to the GHZ test.)
For example, in the case k = 2, Bob asks for seven of
the two-input, two-output devices discussed previously
and considers measuring one of the the eight combina-
tions
P1Q2Q3Q4Q5Q6Q7, Q1P2Q3Q4Q5Q6Q7,
Q1Q2P3Q4Q5Q6Q7, Q1Q2Q3P4Q5Q6Q7,
Q1Q2Q3Q4P5Q6Q7, Q1Q2Q3Q4Q5P6Q7,
Q1Q2Q3Q4Q5Q6P7, P1P2P3P4P5P6P7.
He demands that the products of the outputs for the
first seven combinations are always +1 and for the last
combination, the product of the outputs should be −1.
This can be achieved using PRC’s 7-party generalization
of the GHZ state. For this test, 3 bits of randomness are
required to choose amongst the eight settings, while in
a successful implementation of the test on this state, 6
bits of randomness are generated by the output. If Bob
trusts Eve, the private random string is tripled in length
and for larger k, the expansion is even more dramatic.
Such tests thus look like very good candidates for
private randomness expansion. However, of course, we
still need to introduce privacy amplification to protect
Bob against a dishonest Eve. Using log2 |X1| bits of
private randomness we can perform log2 |X1|log
2
(4k) tests, gen-
erating (approximately) log2 |X1|log
2
(4k) (4k − 2) new bits. If
one uses two-universal hashing for privacy amplification,
29 A word of caution: at present Theorem 1 is only proven to hold
in the case that the randomness used to choose the function is
perfectly uniform and perfectly uncorrelated with S and E.
then in order to choose the hash function, we require
log2 |R| =
log
2
|X1|
log
2
(4k) (4k− 2)+ log2 |X1| bits. We also have
log2 |X | = log2 |X1| + log2 |R|, hence the length of fi-
nal string is (approximately) 2k−1log
2
(4k)+2k−1 log2 |X | bits
longer than the original. Hence, in the limit of large k,
we would intuitively expect the analogous protocols to
roughly double the length of private random string. Fur-
thermore, if a function requiring shorter R were used for
privacy amplification (e.g. that of [31]), the rate increase
with k is potentially greater.
Even if such tests do improve the rate of random string
expansion, though, there are trade-offs. Firstly, more
devices are needed and, secondly, it seems likely that a
longer initial private string is required in order to achieve
a given level of security. The intuition behind this second
statement comes from considering a classical attack. For
a GHZ test, a classical attack can escape detection with
probability 34 per test, while in the kth generalization,
this increases to 4k−14k .
One could also use a test based on the CHSH correla-
tions [34], as considered in [16]. CHSH-based protocols
do not have the convenient cheat-detection property that
protocols based on GHZ correlations (and their general-
izations) possess in the noiseless case: for tests based
on CHSH correlations one can never be completely cer-
tain that cheating has been identified. Nor do they have
the appealing property that correlation tests can be di-
rectly used as new random bits in the case where Eve
is honest. These features of GHZ-based protocols have,
at least, some pedagogical value, allowing as they do a
simple explanation of the basic idea of random string ex-
pansion. However, as far as we are aware, it is generally
an open question to identify which class of Bell violation
allows the most efficient private randomness expansion
protocols for a given set of parameters |X |, ζ, δ and for
a given costing of the various cryptographic and physical
resources involved.
VI. DISCUSSION
Private randomness expansion may be a useful prim-
itive on which to base other protocols in the untrusted
device scenario. More fundamentally, we can think of na-
ture as our untrusted adversary which provides devices.
One could then argue that our protocols strengthen the
belief that nature genuinely generates randomness30.
The untrusted devices scenario is a realistic one, and
seems likely to become important if quantum computers
or quantum cryptosystems become widespread. Ordi-
nary users will not want to construct their own hardware
30 Of course, this assumes both that nature is constrained by the
no-signalling principle and that we can generate some initial ran-
domness uncorrelated with nature’s subsequent behaviour: it is
impossible to rule out cosmic conspiracy.
9and will instead turn to suppliers, just as users of clas-
sical computers and encryption software do today. The
protocols in this paper are designed with the ultimate
aim of offering such users a virtual guarantee that the
devices supplied are behaving in such a way that their
outputs are private and random.
Finally, we note the possibility of the given proto-
cols being secure even against an adversary who is not
bound by quantum theory. As BHK first showed ([3];
see also [10–12]), quantum key distribution protocols can
be provably secure even against such an adversary, pro-
vided certain signalling constraints can be guaranteed. In
the case of our private randomness expansion protocol,
the post-quantum adversary is analogously constrained:
we assume that Bob can ensure there is no signalling be-
tween any of the devices held separately in his laboratory,
nor between any of them and Eve. It is a further open
problem to provide a security proof in this scenario.
We expect that, if additional private randomness can
be securely generated by our protocol in this post-
quantum scenario, it will be at a lower rate than in the
quantum case, since Eve has more general attacks avail-
able.
For instance, Eve can exploit the power of so-called
non-local (NL) boxes—hypothetical devices that max-
imally violate the CHSH inequality. In the notation
introduced in Section II B, the device’s outputs satisfy
p1p2 = −1 and p1q2 = p2q1 = q1q2 = 1 [35, 36]. By
using NL boxes, Eve can always know the output of one
of the devices. For example, if she sets the third device
to output 1 and the first two to obey the NL box condi-
tions given above, she will always pass a GHZ test. It is
therefore clear that at most one bit of private random-
ness would result from each test (rather than close to two
bits if Eve uses a quantum strategy).
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Appendix
The technique that we follow here is based on that used
to find the complete set of states and measurements pro-
ducing maximal violation of the CHSH inequality [36].
We seek the complete set of tripartite states (in fi-
nite dimensional Hilbert spaces), and two-setting mea-
surement devices that output either 1 or −1, such that,
denoting the observables measured by device i by Pˆi and
Qˆi, we have
Pˆ1 ⊗ Pˆ2 ⊗ Pˆ3 |Ψ〉 = − |Ψ〉 (8)
Qˆ1 ⊗ Qˆ2 ⊗ Pˆ3 |Ψ〉 = |Ψ〉 (9)
Qˆ1 ⊗ Pˆ2 ⊗ Qˆ3 |Ψ〉 = |Ψ〉 (10)
Pˆ1 ⊗ Qˆ2 ⊗ Qˆ3 |Ψ〉 = |Ψ〉 . (11)
Here |Ψ〉 is the tripartite state. (We consider the case of
pure states since the mixed state case follows immediately
from it.) We then have
F |Ψ〉 ≡
1
4
(
Pˆ1 ⊗ Qˆ2 ⊗ Qˆ3 + Qˆ1 ⊗ Pˆ2 ⊗ Qˆ3+ (12)
Qˆ1 ⊗ Qˆ2 ⊗ Pˆ3 − Pˆ1 ⊗ Pˆ2 ⊗ Pˆ3
)
|Ψ〉 = |Ψ〉 .
|Ψ〉 is thus an eigenstate of F with eigenvalue 1, so that
F 2 |Ψ〉 = |Ψ〉. This is equivalent to
(i[Pˆ1, Qˆ1]⊗ i[Pˆ2, Qˆ2]⊗ 1 + i[Pˆ1, Qˆ1]⊗ 1 ⊗ i[Pˆ3, Qˆ3] +
1 ⊗ i[Pˆ2, Qˆ2]⊗ i[Pˆ3, Qˆ3]) |Ψ〉 = 12 |Ψ〉 ,
where [Pˆ , Qˆ] := Pˆ Qˆ − QˆPˆ is the commutator of Pˆ and
Qˆ.
The maximum eigenvalue of i[Pˆ1, Qˆ1] is 2, hence
i[Pˆ1, Qˆ1]⊗ i[Pˆ2, Qˆ2]⊗ 1 |Ψ〉 = 4 |Ψ〉 (13)
and similar relations for the other permutations. We
hence have i[Pˆ1, Qˆ1]⊗1 ⊗1 |Ψ〉 = 2 |Ψ〉 from which it fol-
lows that 〈Ψ|
({
Pˆ1, Qˆ1
}
⊗ 1 ⊗ 1
)2
|Ψ〉 = 0, and hence
that
({
Pˆ1, Qˆ1
}
⊗ 1 ⊗ 1
)
|Ψ〉 = 0, where {Pˆ , Qˆ} :=
Pˆ Qˆ + QˆPˆ is the anti-commutator of Pˆ and Qˆ, and we
use that Pˆi and Qˆi have outcomes ±1 and hence satisfy
Pˆ 2i |ψ〉 = |ψ〉 and Qˆ
2
i |ψ〉 = |ψ〉.
Consider the following Schmidt decomposition: |Ψ〉 =∑n
i=1 λi |i1〉 |i23〉, where λi ≥ 0 ∀ i, and n is the dimen-
sionality of the first system. Then, if λi 6= 0 ∀ i, the
{|i1〉} are n eigenstates of
{
Pˆ1, Qˆ1
}
, each having eigen-
value 0. Since there are only n eigenstates, we must have{
Pˆ1, Qˆ1
}
= 0.
If some of the λi are zero, then we can define a projec-
tor onto the non-zero subspace. Call this Π1, and define
pˆ1 = Π1Pˆ1Π1 and qˆ1 = Π1Qˆ1Π1. Similarly, define pro-
jectors Π2 and Π3, and hence operators pˆ2, qˆ2 and pˆ3, qˆ3
by taking the Schmidt decomposition for systems (1,3)
and 2, and (1,2) and 3, respectively. It is then clear that
1
4
(pˆ1 ⊗ qˆ2 ⊗ qˆ3 + qˆ1 ⊗ pˆ2 ⊗ qˆ3 + qˆ1 ⊗ qˆ2 ⊗ pˆ3 −
pˆ1 ⊗ pˆ2 ⊗ pˆ3) |Ψ〉 = |Ψ〉
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holds for the projected operators, and hence, these satisfy
{pˆi, qˆi} = 0 for i = 1, 2, 3.
The relations, pˆ2i = 1 , qˆ
2
i = 1 , {pˆi, qˆi} = 0 then ap-
ply for the Hilbert space restricted by {Πi}. These im-
ply that pˆi, qˆi and
i
2 [qˆi, pˆi] transform like the generators
of SU(2). The operators may form a reducible repre-
sentation, in which case we can construct a block diag-
onal matrix with irreducible representations on the di-
agonal. The anti-commutator property means that only
the two-dimensional representation can appear, hence we
can always pick a basis such that pˆi = 1 di ⊗ σxi and
qˆi = 1 di ⊗σyi for some dimension, di, of identity matrix.
Our state then needs to satisfy 1 d1 ⊗ σx1 ⊗ 1 d2 ⊗ σx2 ⊗
1 d3⊗σx3 |Ψ〉 = − |Ψ〉, and similar relations for the other
combinations analogous to (9–11). By an appropriate
swap operation, this becomes
1 d1d2d3 ⊗ σx1 ⊗ σx2 ⊗ σx3 |Ψ〉 = − |Ψ〉 ,
etc., which makes it clear that the system can be divided
into subspaces, each of which must satisfy the GHZ re-
lation (12). In an appropriate basis, we can write
|Ψ〉 =


a1 |ψGHZ〉
a2 |ψGHZ〉
...

 ,
where |ψGHZ〉 =
1√
2
(|000〉 − |111〉), and the complex co-
efficients {aj} simply weight each subspace and satisfy∑
j |aj |
2 = 1. (Note that |ψj〉 = |ψGHZ〉 is the only solu-
tion to (σx1⊗ σy2⊗ σy3+ σy1⊗ σx2⊗ σy3+ σy1⊗ σy2 ⊗
σx3−σx1⊗σx2⊗σx3) |ψj〉 = 4 |ψj〉, up to global phase.)
We have hence obtained the complete set of states and
operators satisfying (8–11), up to local unitaries.
